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Epistemic clashes in network science:
Mapping the tensions between
idiographic and nomothetic subcultures
Mathieu Jacomy
Abstract
This article maps a controversy in network science over the last 15 years, dividing the field about the epistemic status of
a central notion, scale-freeness. The article accounts for the two main disputes, in 2005 and in 2018, as they unfolded in
academic publications and on social media. This article analyzes the conflict, and the reasons why it reignited in 2018, to
the surprise of many. It is argued that (1) the concept of complex networks is shared by the distinct subcultures of
theorists and experimentalists; and that (2) these subcultures have incompatible approaches to knowledge: nomothetic
(scale-freeness is the sign of a universal law) and idiographic (scale-freeness is an empirical characterization). Following
Galison, this article contends that network science is a trading zone where theorists and experimentalists can trade
knowledge across the epistemic divide.
Keywords
Complex network, controversy mapping, network practices, network science, nomothetic and idiographic,
scale-freeness
[S]cience is disunified, and – against our first intuitions
– it is precisely the disunification of science that under-
pins its strength and stability. (Galison, 1999: 137)
Readers from the field of Science and Technology
Studies (STS) have encountered the network, and
likely observed how disunified it can be: following
Galison’s (1999: 157) metaphor, a laminated mess of
“partially independent strata supporting one another”.
As we argued in a previous article (Venturini et al.,
2019), STS engage with the network in multiple ways.
Actor-network theory (ANT) used the network as a
metaphor to criticize “notions as diverse as institution,
society, [and] nation-state” (Latour, 1999: 15; see also
Law, 1999), although post-ANT moved away from net-
works. More recently, at the intersection of digital
media studies and STS, some scholars use the network
as a “social science apparatus” (Ruppert et al., 2013),
often in a perspective of critical proximity, while
reflecting on the network’s pervasive involvement in
the infrastructure of datafied society. In this context,
like other forms of Big Data, the network’s material-
semiotic properties produce data-worlds, for instance,
as network maps are interpreted as if they are self-
evident (Bounegru et al., 2017; Burrows and Savage,
2014; Marres and Gerlitz, 2016). This movement is crit-
ical of Computational Social Science (Lazer et al.,
2009), and concerned with the theories and models
embodied in network tools (Rieder and R€ohle, 2017),
and their uses and abuses (Marres, 2012). STS scholars
know how problematic the network can be, as the con-
fusion it causes has been documented. Nevertheless,
they did not create their own trouble with networks
(van Geenen et al., forthcoming); they imported it.
STS scholars tend to presume that the disunification
of the network happened when it was repurposed from
the exact sciences, where the network was originally
unified. But this initial state of unity never existed:
The network has always been disputed.
There is no doubt that the raison d’être of the net-
work is that relations deserve no less attention than
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substance; but even that point takes incompatible
meanings in different contexts. Latour (2004: 63)
warns STS scholars: “you should not confuse the net-
work that is drawn by the description and the network
that is used to make the description. . . . Surely you’d
agree that drawing with a pencil is not the same thing
as drawing the shape of a pencil. It’s the same with this
ambiguous word, network.” The network can be either
something we can know or a way to know things (this
argument is developed in Venturini et al., 2019).
In sociology, Erikson (2013) accounts for a
slightly different opposition, between the relationalist
approach, which “rejects [the] essentialism” of the net-
work, and the formalist approach based on a
“structuralist interpretation”. Even within the formalist
approach, prevalent in the natural sciences, the net-
work has conflicting significations.
The transdisciplinary field network science (NS)
emerged in the late 1990s under the joint patronage
of social network analysis and the study of complex
systems (Barabási, 2016; Borgatti et al., 2009), focusing
on a specific type of network: the complex network.
From this crucible dominated by the formalist influ-
ence of physicists, statisticians, and quantitative sociol-
ogists (Hidalgo, 2016), old and new theories and
methods radiate toward the social and natural sciences
(Freeman, 2008; Newman, 2018). Despite its success,
NS witnesses a “clash of two cultures” (Keller, 2007)
where fundamental claims on scale-freeness are disput-
ed for more than a decade.
In this piece, I follow in the footsteps of Galison
(1999) in Trading Zones, but focus on NS. Like him,
I account for the frictions and exchanges between dif-
ferent subcultures. I find experimentalists whose ways
and goals challenge those of theorists. I find that the
(complex) network is a shared object that gets attrib-
uted different meanings in different contexts while
allowing knowledge to circulate over epistemic gaps,
and allowing the field to maintain its continuity. I
argue that controversies in NS illustrate a familiar ten-
sion between digital methods and computational social
science (Baya-Laffite and Benbouzid, 2017; Masson,
2017), and I show that it extends the gap present in
the exact sciences: the nomothetic/idiographic divide.
After introducing the key concepts of NS, and then
my method, I account for the first dispute, in 2005,
regarding which statistical distributions characterize
complex networks. I analyze its commonly accepted
framing as a tension between disciplines, and I explain
why the subsequent efforts of multiple authors to
defend a position of compromise did not put an end
to the controversy. Then I introduce the notions of
nomothetic and idiographic approaches to knowledge,
and account for the second dispute, in 2018, concerning
the experimental procedures capable of assessing the
(alleged) pervasiveness of complex networks. Finally,
I reframe the second dispute as an epistemic clash
between theorists and experimentalists, the latter grad-
ually opposing their own agenda to the former.
Network science is a controversial field
NS is not a firmly delineated discipline but a “highly
interdisciplinary research area” (B€orner et al., 2007)
whose origin is disputed. For Borgatti et al. (2009),
NS emanates from the older and well-established field
of social network analysis. For Barabási (2016) and
Hidalgo (2016), NS’s roots are in the study of complex
systems in the natural sciences, and for Brandes et al.
(2013), in a transdisciplinary mathematical apparatus.
Despite these different perspectives, all scholars
acknowledge multiple points of origin, and the trouble
it causes. Freeman (2008) accounts for two distinct
communities within the field, and their mutual influ-
ence. Keller (2005, 2007) argues against the “lure of
universality” and points to a “clash of two cultures”.
Erikson (2013: 219) writes that the field “often mixes
two distinct theoretical frameworks, creating a logically
inconsistent foundation.” Hidalgo (2016) wonders
whether the field is “disconnected, fragmented, or uni-
ted,” arguing that social and natural scientists do not
understand each other because they have different
goals. However, although there is consensus on the
presence of tensions between disciplines, these authors
disagree about which disciplines are clashing, and why.
I argue that the hypothesis of a disciplinary divide is
not sufficient, as it fails to explain why the controversy
reignites in 2018—which network scientists see as
“surprising” (Holme, 2019). Before we get to that
point, I must briefly present NS and several concepts
necessary for understanding its contentious points.
The key concepts of network science
NS focuses on the study of complex networks. Euler’s
work in the 18th century gives birth to graph theory,
and Moreno’s (1934) sociograms initiate the practice of
visualizing social networks (Freeman, 2000). During
the late 1990s, NS emerges as an interdisciplinary
field around the object complex network (Barabási,
2016; Borgatti et al., 2009; B€orner et al., 2007). The
notion is invented almost simultaneously by two
different teams: Watts and Strogatz (1998), who call
it small-world and Barabási and Albert (1999), who
call it scale-free. Both teams draw inspiration from
the work of Erd}os and Renyi (1960) on the random
graph model, a probabilistic version of the network. It
matches for the first time general properties of many
empirical phenomena (see Barabási, 2002). The com-
plex network has no precise definition, but nevertheless,
2 Big Data & Society
refers to a special kind, as Wikipedia puts it, one “with
non-trivial topological features”. In a nutshell, complex
networks stand somewhere between order and disorder
(see Figure 1).
The NS controversy is specifically about scale-
freeness, a criterion Barabási and Albert use to charac-
terize complex networks. In their model, as a network
grows, its new nodes favor linking to the most con-
nected nodes, a phenomenon known as preferential
attachment. This phenomenon is similar to the
Matthew effect (Merton, 1968), also known as “the
rich get richer, and the poor get poorer.” The resulting
network is called “scale-free” because it features the
same properties across multiple scales. Specifically,
the degree of the nodes, i.e., the number of neighbors,
follows a power-law distribution (a statistical distribu-
tion itself scale-free). In practical terms, a few nodes get
the most links (the “hubs”), while most nodes are
poorly connected.
Pervasiveness is not a concept of NS, but a term
I use to refer to one of its main rhetorical points: the
empirical observation of the same phenomenon across
many unrelated situations. Pervasiveness calls for an
answer to an implicit question: Why do we observe
the same thing in contexts that have a priori nothing
in common? If your goal is to discover laws of nature,
pervasiveness is a remarkable observation, because it
suggests an underlying pattern.
Universality is a misleading but important concept,
which one needs to understand at least superficially.
The pervasiveness of the power law has been known
in thermodynamics since the 1970s, under the pompous
name of universality (Feigenbaum, 1976). Physicists
explain this pervasiveness with the concept of self-
organized criticality (Bak et al., 1987), which states
that the power law naturally arises at the tipping
point of a phase transition (called “criticality”)
for mathematical reasons related to scale-freeness.
Physicists such as Barabási translate this argument
from thermodynamics to NS, based on three facts.
(1) Phase transition and the Erd}os–Renyi random
graph model are instances of a process known as per-
colation (the emergence of a “strongly connected
component” in a random graph is similar to the appa-
rition of ice crystals in cooling water). (2) The power
law and the complex network are pervasive. (3) The
power law characterizes complex networks (via scale-
freeness). From these premises, physicists deduce that
the power law is the external sign of an underlying
complex network. This idea took the name of
universality because it extends Feigenbaum’s work,
but it actually means something quite different.
Feigenbaum’s universality is only an observation;
NS’s universality states a law of nature.
I refer to this as the argument of universality, and the
important point is to track how it changes. The argu-
ment appears under different forms in the publications
of network scientists such as Barabási. In its strongest
form, it affirms the existence of a universal law of com-
plexity, explaining the pervasiveness of the power law
and the complex network. The claim is supposed to be
rooted in a mixture of graph theory and physics of
complex systems, but experimental results gradually
accumulated as evidence against it. The claim then
degrades into a weaker form, stating the existence of
unspecified laws, on the grounds of the pervasiveness of
the properties of the complex network. Finally, in its
weakest form, universality means only pervasiveness,
which fits its colloquial meaning and Feigenbaum’s ver-
sion. The strongest form claims the existence of a law;
the weakest is only an empirical observation. The weak
version requires only evidence, but the strong version
also requires a theory. These different meanings must
not be conflated because they have different validity
conditions. Some researchers voice this criticism
(Watts and Clauset as cited in Klarreich, 2018). As
Barrat et al. (2008: 296) put it, “physicists know
extremely well that the universality of some statistical
laws is not to be confused with the ‘equivalence
Figure 1. Three types of networks, about 1000 nodes each. The complex network (center) is sometimes presented as an
intermediary between order (left, a square lattice) and disorder (right, a random network).
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of systems’.” In the current state of the controversy,
even the weakest form is contested.
Many researchers challenge the pervasiveness of the
power law based on its resemblance to the log-normal
distribution (a cousin of the famous normal distribu-
tion, aka the “bell curve”). Both are quite similar in
practice, when it comes to matching empirical observa-
tions, but scale-freeness is related only to the power
law, via the preferential attachment model. In this dis-
pute, the empirical ground of scale-free pervasiveness is
at stake. The heavy-tailed distribution is a notion intro-
duced subsequently to subsume the log-normal and
power-law distributions.
Mapping the controversy
The controversy unfolds in two distinct moments,
characterized by the accumulation of traces in the
digital public space as network scientists debate on
their blogs, Twitter, and arXiv, a platform hosting
non-peer-reviewed pre-prints. The first dispute happens
in 2005 and focuses on the resemblance between the
log-normal and power-law distributions. The second
happens in 2018 and challenges more directly the mea-
sure of scale-freeness.
My methodology is based on document analysis
and draws on controversy mapping (Venturini, 2010).
I “follow the actors” (Latour, 1987) to identify the
points they see as controversial. I often refer to the
researchers involved in the debates as actors or network
scientists, for simplicity and because they all engage
with NS, although they do not always qualify them-
selves as such.
The controversy has no clear boundaries. The NS
concepts and methods are challenged and discussed
over its two decades of existence, as for any scientific
field. In this article, I specifically investigate the con-
tentious points whose resolution is contested by actors:
when they also disagree about their disagreement.
I coded a selection of 40 academic and non-
academic publications related to the controversy.
I explored the literature with snowballing sampling
before reducing the corpus to a set of key documents.
I selected explicit refutations, refuted articles, commen-
tary, major publications citing the disputes (e.g.,
attempts at concluding them), and major references.
See Table 1 for the list and Figure 3 for a contextual-
ized visualization.
Figures 2 and 3 help familiarize readers with the
corpus. For the sake of clarity, I classified the docu-
ments into four groups. The initial references in 1999–
2000 show early signs of the controversy. I gathered
publications explicitly referring to each academic feud
in the 2005 dispute and the 2018 dispute. The ongoing
discussion group contains contributions that do not
refer explicitly to either feud.
The evolution of citations (Figure 2) shows that
the 2005 controversy is rarely cited by subsequent pub-
lications. The 2018 controversy largely builds on the
2007–2016 academic discussion.
Placing the documents and their type in chronolog-
ical order (Figure 3) shows that two waves of reactions
happen after the publication of a polemic piece: self-
published web commentary in the following weeks and
then, academic articles featuring refutations in the fol-
lowing years.
I reduced my qualitative exploration of this corpus
to a coding of 12 different arguments framing the con-
troversy, expressing a specific perspective on scale-
freeness and universality, or taking an epistemic pos-
ture. Each of the 120 data points consists of a brief
quote exemplifying a given argument featured in a
given publication. The data is available as supplemen-
tal material.
I further reduced this corpus by focusing on the 13
most recurrent actors: Alderson, Doyle, and Willinger
(who always published together in this corpus), Amaral
and Malmgren (idem), Barabási, Barzel, Clauset,
Holme, Mitzenmacher, Shalizi, Vespignani, and
Watts. Figure 4 shows the co-publication groups in
the corpus. These 13 key actors effectively form 10
groups or single actors. I picked this number to
ensure that each presented enough material for the
analysis.
I compiled the statements of the key actors by
period in a table available as supplemental material.
It comprises 79 quotes. Table 2 presents each argument
with two examples of quotes. Figure 5 features which
key actor states which argument during which period.
Actors’ view of the controversy
Before engaging with the matter of the two disputes, I
summarize how the actors of the controversy frame it
themselves. Their recurrent arguments are the
following:
1. A disciplinary divide
2. A matter of how public relations are enacted by cer-
tain researchers
3. An issue of conceptual ambiguity
Argument 1
“For Vespignani, the debate illustrates a gulf between
the mindsets of physicists and statisticians” (Klarreich,
2018). A similar opinion is voiced by half of the key
actors (see Figure 4), although the problem is rarely
situated precisely. Holme (2018b) characterizes the


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 Big Data & Society
divide as “emergentists” who “didn’t lose faith in the
buzzwords of the nineties’ complexity science” such as
“universality” versus “statisticalists” for whom
“scale-freeness is not scientifically important if it is
not testable.” Keller (2007) similarly points at the
goal of seeking laws of nature: “biologists have been
little concerned about whether their findings might
achieve the status of a law. . . .Physical scientists, how-
ever, come from a different tradition—one in which the
search for universal laws has taken high priority.”
However, in contrast to the hypothesis of a disciplinary
divide, Clauset insists instead on the “importance
of . . . good statistics” regardless of the discipline
(Keller, 2005).
Argument 2
Barabási’s critiques condemn his “grand claims of uni-
versality” and his “apparent arrogance” (Clauset,
2005b). The former symmetrically suggests that the
latter exaggerate their claims “to get maximal
attention” (Barabási, 2018). Barabási’s fiercest oppo-
nents see a scientific issue in his promotion of what
they consider disproved claims: “Garbage In, Gospel
Out” (Willinger et al., 2009: 598). However, Barabási
always responds to the refutation of his articles (see the
red arrows in Figure 3) and is supported by respected
researchers (Holme, 2019). There is no consensus on
the disproval of Barabási’s claims, and some even
find that “all his talk about networks is good for com-
puter science in general” (Venkatasubramanian, 2005).
Argument 3
In 2018, Clauset and Holme mention conceptual ambi-
guity as a cause of the controversy. More generally,
many authors acknowledge the absence of a clear def-
inition for important concepts, occasionally explained
by the lack of maturity of NS as a field (Vespignani in
Klarreich, 2018).
The idea of a disciplinary divide is popular after the
first dispute (Keller, 2007). It may explain why the aca-
demic activity between 2007 and 2016 aims at filling a
knowledge gap (most notably in Barrat et al., 2008;
Clauset et al., 2009; Perc, 2014; Stumpf and Porter,
2012). The same actors were surprised when the con-
troversy reignited in 2018, which suggests that they
believed they had ended it. Klarreich (2018) quotes
Vespignani: “the important question is not whether a
network is precisely scale-free but whether it has a
heavy tail . . . I thought the community was agreeing
on that.” Similarly, Holme (2019) states: “I, and
(I believe) most colleagues, were following the principle
that ‘knowledge of whether or not a distribution is
heavy-tailed is far more important than whether it
can be fit using a power law’ . . .Thus, it was surprising
that the scale-free debate would flare up again.”
First dispute: Power-law and log-normal
distributions, 2005
The dispute is about the claim that observed power
laws are log-normal distributions. Some argue a flaw
Figure 2. Network of citations between coded publications over time. The node size indicates the number of times cited in the
corpus.
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exists in the statistical procedure used to identify power
laws, thus challenging their pervasiveness. The dispute
unfolds as follows.
In May 2005, Barabási (2005) publishes an article on
the presence of “heavy tails in human dynamics”.
In October, Stouffer et al. (2005: 1) publish on the
online repository arXiv1 (no peer review) a refutation
of Barabási’s claim that “the dynamics of a number of
human activities are scale-free.” They argue that “the
reported power-law distributions are solely an artifact
of the analysis of the empirical data.”
In the days following the release of Stouffer et al.’s
pre-print, other researchers comment on the dispute on
their respective blogs (Clauset, 2005a; Shalizi, 2005;
Venkatasubramanian, 2005). Clauset (2005a) frames
it as a matter of “good empirical research” and sum-
marizes the main sticking point as such: “[Stouffer
et al.] eliminate the power law as a model, and instead
Figure 3. Corpus of 40 documents coded for this study, in chronological order. It includes type of document, direct and indirect
refutations, and mentions of other documents in the corpus.
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show that the distributions are better described by a
log-normal distribution.”
Venkatasubramanian includes Mitzenmacher in the
controversy. Venkatasubramanian interviews
Mitzenmacher, defending the impossibility of contrast-
ing the two distributions in practice, as he had estab-
lished in a previous publication (Mitzenmacher, 2004).
In November, Barabási et al. (2005: 2) publish a
response to Stouffer et al.’s rebuttal, on arXiv as
well. First, they acknowledge that both distributions
match observations, but add that Stouffer et al.’s
claim stems from a misunderstanding of the original
data set. Second, they argue that their work “fails to
propose an alternative mechanism indicating that a
lognormal distribution could also emerge,” and there-
fore, “is a mere exercise in statistics, one that has little
hope to be conclusive” on a larger data set. From that
point in time, Mitzenmacher’s argument on the relative
irrelevance to contrast the log-normal and power-law
distributions meets consensus in the community.
In a second blog post, Clauset (2005b) comments on
the dispute, and like Mitzenmacher, reframes it to
account for the role of Barabási’s rhetoric in the recep-
tion of his work:
Barabasi is not one to shy away from grand claims of
universality. . . .[His work] does not show causality, nor
does it provide falsifiable hypotheses by which it could
be invalidated. Barabasi’s work in this case is sugges-
tive but not explanatory, and should be judged
accordingly. To me, it seems that the contention over
the result derives partly from the overstatement of its
generality, i.e., the authors claims their model to be
explanatory.
Clauset criticizes the strong version of the argument of
universality, and points at a specific problem with
Barabási’s laws-seeking approach: It is not falsifiable.
However, note that Clauset does not contest the
method or its result, qualified as “suggestive” but
empirically valid if “judged accordingly”.
Between the two disputes
After a second pre-print from Stouffer et al. (2006)
refining their argument, the dispute moves to the classic
academic space of peer-reviewed publications. At this
point, most authors acknowledge that “whether or not
a distribution is heavy-tailed is far more important
than whether it can be fit using a power law”
(Holme, 2019).
A series of publications contest specific claims on
scale-freeness. Keller (2005, 2007) refines her epistemic
critique of universality. Malmgren et al. (2008, 2009)
show that heavy-tailed distributions in complex net-
works are not necessarily caused by preferential attach-
ment and propose an alternative model. Muchnik et al.
(2013) support the point. Alderson et al. (2019) keep
refuting the scale-free model in the case of internet, a
critique they formulate during every phase of the con-
troversy, but without mentioning either dispute (Doyle
et al., 2005; Willinger et al., 2004, 2009).
Clauset solidifies his position with the help of Shalizi
and Newman (Clauset et al., 2009). They develop a
rigorous framework for testing scale-freeness, confirm-
ing certain empirical observations of power laws and
ruling out others.
Stumpf and Porter (2012) also publish an article
presented in 2018 as the final point on the controversy.2
“The most productive use of power laws in the real
world will . . . come from recognizing their ubiqui-
ty . . . rather than from imbuing them with a vague
and mistakenly mystical sense of universality” (666).
Despite critiques, Barabási keeps supporting the
argument of universality, albeit under a weaker form
(Barzel and Barabási, 2013). The situation leads
Pachter (2014) to comment on his blog that
“Barabási’s ‘work’ is a regular feature in the journals
Nature and Science despite the fact that many eminent
scientists keep demonstrating that the network emperor
has no clothes,” echoing the recurrent claim that the
pervasiveness of power laws is a “myth” (Lima-Mendez
and Van Helden, 2009; Shalizi, 2010; Willinger
et al., 2009).
Figure 4. Authors and their publications in the corpus. Note: it























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Barabási publishes the book Network Science (2016)
commenting on the first dispute that “as long as there is
empirical data to be fitted, the debate surrounding the
best fit will never die out” (151) and standing behind
the pervasiveness of the power law despite a “decade-
long crusade against network science” (16).
The second dispute makes visible why the disagree-
ment persists. Before I get to this point, I must establish
how the controversy differs from its depiction by
actors, so that we can see beyond the hypothesis of a
disciplinary divide.
The actors’ positions during the first
dispute
I account for the position of key actors on scale-
freeness across the two disputes by tracking the four
following statements, systematically coded for the 40
publications of the corpus:
1. We CAN contrast the power-law and log-normal
distribution in empirical situations.
2. We CANNOT contrast them.
3. Scale-freeness requires a better statistical
characterization.
4. A basic test of scale-freeness is useful to science even
if it is not perfectly rigorous.
I use these statements as an analytical grid of argu-
mentative positions that key actors may or may not
occupy during each dispute. I show this grid visually
for ease of understanding. As only the first two
statements are mutually exclusive, I juxtapose only
them. According to the key actors’ narrative,
“statisticians” defend the possibility to contrast distri-
butions, and “physicists” argue that it does not matter
in empirical situations. I position the statements
accordingly, as illustrated in Figure 6.
The beginning of the 2005 dispute follows the narra-
tive of the physicist/statistician divide. Before the dis-
pute, the empirical issues of contrasting log-normal
and power-law distributions are not common knowl-
edge (Figure 7(a)). The “statistician” critique (Stouffer
et al., 2005) defends the necessity of better procedures
(Figure 7(b)). The “physicists’” response minimizes the
importance of the log-normal distribution in empirical
situations (Venkatasubramanian, 2005; drawing on
Mitzenmacher, 2004), and defends the relevance of
modeling despite its apparent statistical weakness
(Barabási et al., 2005; Figure 7(c)). The argument
hinges on the fact that the power law has a model
(preferential attachment) while the log-normal distribu-
tion does not. At this point of the first dispute, the
hypothesis of a disciplinary divide explains well how
the controversy unfolds.
This is how actors explain the closing of the disciplin-
ary gap, disregarding their surprise that it reignites
later. Vespignagni states, “the important question is
not whether a network is precisely scale-free but wheth-
er it has a heavy tail” (Klarreich, 2018).
Mitzenmacher’s point quickly prevails, and both
“sides” acknowledge the practical issues of contrasting
the debated distributions. Then, to cite Clauset (2005a),
one can ask for “good tools and good statistics” while
Figure 5. Statements by key actors per period: before and during the 2005 controversy, between the two controversies, and during
the 2018 controversy. Corresponding quotes are available as supplemental material.
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acknowledging the benefit of “suggestive” work
(Clauset, 2005b). Coexistence between “physicists”
and “statisticians” is, after all, possible (Figure 8(a)).
As my coding shows (Figure 5), Clauset, Shalizi, and
Vespignani acknowledge both positions in their publi-
cations (Barrat et al., 2008; Clauset et al., 2009; Shalizi,
2010; see Figure 8(b)). This seems a conscious effort at
conciliation, as Vespignani later explains that
despite “a gulf between the mindsets of physicists and
statisticians . . . both . . . have valuable perspectives”
(Klarreich, 2018). This reasonable consensus point is
summarized by Stumpf and Porter (2012: 666) as
such: “knowledge of whether or not a distribution is
heavy-tailed is far more important than whether it can
be fit using a power law.” Holme (2019) finally com-
ments on it: “I, and (I believe) most colleagues, were
following [this] principle.”
Why the controversy reignites in 2018 despite this
considerable reconciliation effort is worth investigating.
I visualize the coding of key actors (Figure 5) using this
grid in Figure 9, for convenience. Notice Clauset’s tra-
jectory, as he follows the sequence in reverse: He starts
in the “happily ever after” position (Figure 8(b)) in 2005
and moves to the typical “statistician” position (Figure 6
(a)) in 2018. The second dispute is triggered by a pre-
print by Broido and Clauset (2018).
Clauset actively contributes to reaching consensus
until the second dispute. He refrains from framing
Figure 6. Positions in the narrative of a disciplinary divide. Dashed boxes represent the positions contingent to each side.
Figure 7. How the first dispute unfolds, according to the hypothesis of a disciplinary divide. Dashed boxes represent
positions not considered at that point.
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the debate as a disciplinary matter and co-publishes
with statisticians and physicists. His publications are
respected and show an in-depth understanding of
Barabási’s position. “Power-law Distributions in
Empirical Data” (Clauset et al., 2009) is the second
most-cited publication of the corpus, cited by
Barabási (2016, 2018) twice. However, Clauset
(2005b) also requires “falsifiable hypotheses”.
It is this imperative of falsifiability, and not a disciplin-
ary divide, that grounds his reopening of the
controversy.
To understand how a criterion as consensual as fal-
sifiability can become controversial, I need to introduce
two approaches to knowledge that renders visible the
epistemological commitment of network scientists,
notably during the second dispute.
The nomothetic and idiographic
subcultures of network science
The type of knowledge Barabási produces determines
his position in the controversy. His approach postu-
lates the existence of universal structures: Phenomena
obey laws, and the purpose of science is to find them.
This position is what the philosopher Windelband
introduced as the nomothetic approach to knowledge
(Lindlof, 2008; see also Munk, 2019), from the Greek
“proposition of the law”. From that perspective,
Figure 8. How the controversy was supposed to close, according to the hypothesis of a disciplinary divide.
Figure 9. Statements of key actors during three different periods. Some annotation highlights the difference with the precedent
period.
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regularities are how nature tells us its structure, and
science tries to understand that language. Barabási is
the textbook example of the nomothetic mind. See, for
instance, how he presents the power law in his best-
seller book Linked (2002: 77, emphasis added):
Nature normally hates power laws. In ordinary systems
all quantities follow bell curves, and correlations decay
rapidly, obeying exponential laws. But all that changes
if the system is forced to undergo a phase transition.
Then power laws emerge - nature’s unmistakable sign
that chaos is departing in favor of order. The theory of
phase transitions told us loud and clear that the road
from disorder to order is maintained by the powerful
forces of self-organization and is paved by power laws.
It told us that power laws are not just another way of
characterizing a system’s behavior. They are the patent
signatures of self-organization in complex systems.
Windelband opposes the nomothetic to the idiographic
approach to knowledge. This other perspective focuses
on accounting for the specifics of phenomena. It is con-
sidered typical of the humanities, and the usual idio-
graphic use of networks is to describe (see e.g.
Grandjean, 2016; Venturini et al., 2018). Some
researchers such as Clauset adopt this approach, as
they try to stabilize metrics capable of characterizing
scale-free phenomena. Their goal is to improve the
descriptive process regardless of general implications.
Their phenomena may well disobey laws—if that is
what experiments find. This independence of generality
is what makes their position idiographic.
Galison (1999) remarks that “[e]ach subculture has
its own rhythms of change, each has its own standards
of demonstration, and each is embedded differently in
the wider culture of institutions, practices, inventions,
and ideas” (143). He observes how “theorists trade
experimental predictions for experimentalists’ results”
(146). In the second dispute, I find similar interactions
between nomothetic theorists, such as Barabási, and




The second dispute focuses directly on scale-freeness. It
extends the first one, with similar arguments and
involves some of the same actors, but unfolds
differently.
In 1999, Barabási and Albert publish two famous
articles. In the first one (Albert et al., 1999), they
study the structure of the World Wide Web and mea-
sure that the probabilities of a page to cite or to be
cited “follow a power-law over several orders of
magnitude” (130). In the second (Barabási and
Albert, 1999), they introduce the concept of preferen-
tial attachment and measure multiple data sets to con-
clude that “large networks self-organize into a
scale-free state” (510). This article, considered a pillar
of network science, states for the first time the disputed
point: that scale-freeness is pervasive.
In January 2018, Broido and Clauset publish on
arXiv the pre-print “Scale-free Networks Are Rare”.
They retrace the origin and circulation of Barabási
and Albert’s original statement:
Across scientific domains and different types of net-
works, it is common to encounter the claim that most
or all real-world networks are scale free. The precise
details of this claim vary across the literature . . .Some
versions of this “scale-free hypothesis” make the
requirements stronger . . .Other versions make them
weaker. (1)
To challenge the “scale-free hypothesis,” they “carry
out a broad test of the universality of scale-free net-
works by applying state-of-the-art statistical methods
to a large and diverse corpus of real-world networks”
(2). They conclude that “genuinely scale-free networks
are remarkably rare, and scale-free structure is not a
universal” (7). The pre-print triggers an instant reac-
tion on the web, notably on Twitter.3
In the following days, Holme (2018a) comments in a
blog post that “if we could rewrite history and redefine
power-laws as ‘something that follows a straight line in
a log-log histogram if you squint from the side of a
computer screen’, then they would, for sure, be
abundant” (the reconciliation position, see Figure 8
(b)).
In the following days, Barzel (2018) publishes a
short piece online aligned with Holme’s position: “the
meaningfulness of scale-free supersedes its detailed
empirical accurateness.” He finds the discussion
“roughly aligned along a disciplinary divide”.
One month after Broido and Clauset’s pre-print,
Klarreich (2018) publishes a piece in Quanta
Magazine, presenting and explaining the controversy
at length and with great clarity. Despite the absence
of peer review, Klarreich writes that “network scientists
agree, by and large, that the article’s analysis is statis-
tically sound.” Like Holme and Barzel, she sees two
camps and the disciplinary influence of physics. On
one side, “supporters of the scale-free viewpoint,
many of whom came to network science by way of
physics, argue that scale-freeness is intended as an ide-
alized model.” On the other, “critics object that terms
like ‘scale-free’ and ‘heavy-tailed’ are bandied about in
the network science literature in such vague and
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inconsistent ways as to make the subject’s central
claims unfalsifiable.”
Two months after the publication of the pre-print,
Barabási (2018) issues a rebuttal on his website. This
self-published piece is more didactic and more polemic
than a typical academic publication. For him, Broido
and Clauset fail to recognize the scale-free mechanism
“[b]y insisting to fit a pure power law to every network,
and ignoring what the theory predicts for any of them.”
Barabási also challenges the relevance of their proce-
dure: “And the real surprise? Even the exact model of
scale-free networks, following a pure power law, fails
their test. . . .The true failure is their methodology: It
fails to detect that the gold standard is scale-free.” He
concludes that “the study is oblivious to 18 years of
knowledge accumulated in network science.” His
response ignores the question of falsifiability, and chal-
lenges the relevance of the measurement procedure.
In November, Holme (2018b) exposes “the state of
affairs” in another blog post: “Simply speaking, there
are two camps: those seeing scale-freeness as an emer-
gent property, and those seeing it as a statistical prop-
erty.” On one side, “emergentists . . . view scale-free
networks essentially as outlined in Barabási and
Albert’s Emergence of scaling in random
networks, . . . [and] didn’t lose faith in the buzzwords
of the nineties’ complexity science: universality, frac-
tals, self-similarity, criticality, emergence.” On the
other, “statisticalists [argue] that scale-freeness is not
scientifically important if it is not testable . . . [and] are
on top of the latest data science trends.” He concludes
that “[t]he disappointing realization is that whether
scale-free networks are rare [or not] is really a choice
that needs to be argued by words”—a nice example of
Kuhn’s (1962) “paradigm incommensurability”.
On 4 March 2019, Nature Communication publishes
two articles: Broido and Clauset’s (2019) revised article
“Scale-free Networks Are Rare” and Holme’s (2019)
complementary article, “Rare and Everywhere:
Perspectives on Scale-free Networks.”
Broido and Clauset’s (2019) revised article is sub-
stantially the same, retaining the original data and
analysis, making the argument clearer and more
solid. They clarify that their definition of scale-
freeness is not based on preferential attachment and
add a “robustness analysis” section implicitly address-
ing Barabási’s technical and conceptual concerns.
Holme (2019) summarizes the controversy and
reflects on it. For him, the “controversial topic” is to
know whether “scale-free networks rare or universal”
and “important or not”. He argues that “in the
Platonic realm of simple mechanistic models, . . . the
concepts of emergence, universality and scale-freeness
are well-defined and clear. However, in the real
world, . . . they become blurry. . . .Now we have one
camp . . . thinking of scale-free networks as ideal objects
. . ., and another seeing them as concrete objects
belonging to the real world.” He suggests finding con-
sensus by acknowledging the legitimacy of studying
complexity-related notions, such as scale-freeness, and
the need to build a better statistical framework. He
remarks finally that “it often feels like the topic of
scale-free networks transcends science.”
The unresolved tension between
idiographic and nomothetic subcultures
The argument of universality is divisive. My coding
identified six publications stating it (four co-signed by
Barabási), and nine publications criticizing it. Only one
does both (Barrat et al., 2008), making a similar point
as Holme: Universality is a defined concept “related
to the identification of general classes of complex
networks” (76), but “all knowledgeable physicists
would agree” that “the quest for universal laws . . . can-
not apply to network science” (296). The other publi-
cations mentioning universality pick a side.
Although a formal critique of universality for com-
plex networks exists since at least 2005 (Keller), Barzel
and Barabási (2013) disregard it. They acknowledge
that “a mathematical framework that uncovers the uni-
versal properties of [complex networks] continues to
elude us” (673) but do not question the idea itself.
Network Science (Barabási, 2016) adopts the same
position. This lack of dialogue suggests incompatible
worldviews.
Keller develops the most precise argument against
universality. She identifies a “clash of two cultures”
with the “tradition . . . in which the search for universal
laws has taken high priority,” i.e., the nomothetic
approach (2007). For her, the argument of universality
is invalid, and successful only for reasons external to
the criteria for scientific truth. She explains the “faith
in . . . ‘the unique and deep meaning of power laws’” by
“the rapid growth of the sector of the publishing
industry” and “the remarkably effective uses of lan-
guage employed in presenting these ideas” (2005:
1067). However, as power laws “are not as ubiquitous
as was thought,” and it “tells us nothing about the
mechanisms that give rise to them,” the claim “that
scale-free networks are a ‘universal architecture’ . . . are
problematic” (2007).
The “clash” is not about the universality of scale-
freeness; this is just a disagreement. The clash is about
the scientific status of the disagreement. Some consider
universality disproved; others consider it legitimate.
For the first, “the network emperor has no clothes”
(Pachter, 2014); the second disregard the critique.
16 Big Data & Society
This controversy is a disagreement about a disagree-
ment, and the parties lack common ground to settle
their contention. Klarreich (2018) comments on
Broido and Clauset’s (2018) pre-print, that it “seems
to be functioning like a Rorschach test, in which both
proponents and critics of the scale-free paradigm see
what they already believed to be true.” Clauset and
Barabási do not see scale-freeness from the same
perspective.
Clauset and Watts focus on falsifiability, in the clas-
sic Popperian sense. It shows that they see universality
as a hypothesis, an evaluable statement. Clauset
remarks early that Barabási’s work does not “provide
falsifiable hypotheses” and later, that the “scale-free
hypothesis” (Broido and Clauset, 2018) “sounds like
a nonfalsifiable hypothesis” (Klarreich, 2018). Watts
criticizes that “the claim just sort of slowly morphs to
conform to all the evidence, while still maintaining its
brand label surprise factor” (Klarreich, 2018).
In contrast, Barzel and Barabási’s (2013) nomothet-
ic approach proceeds by postulating universality, for
instance, when they seek “a mathematical framework
that uncovers the universal properties of [complex
networks]”. Barabási’s position on modeling also
shows this. I coded the argument that empirical meas-
ures only make sense when backed by a model: Only
Barabási states it during each period (see Figure 5).
He sees attempts to measure scale-freeness without a
model as “a mere exercise in statistics” (Barabási et al.,
2005), because for him, the meaning of the findings
derives from the postulate of universality embodied in
the model. The postulate is part of his way to know.
The different sides of the dispute implicitly disagree
on the validity conditions applicable to universality.
For Clauset and Watts, universality is a hypothesis
that can be proven or disproven. For Barzel and
Barabási, it is an epistemic device.
The nomothetic approach to knowledge postulates
the existence of universal laws, but it does not state
their empirical reality. Keller’s (2005) critique that it
is a “faith” is a misinterpretation. The postulate of uni-
versality determines an experimental program: which
experiments to conduct and how to interpret them.
But they can fail. Universality may “elude us” (Barzel
and Barabási, 2013). Even so, it drives the scientific
process. Questioning the postulate of universality is
questioning the entire nomothetic approach. As the
latter has been undeniably successful in physics, it con-
fers on universality a remarkably solid foundation.
This may explain why Holme and Vespignani defend
universality.
Conversely, Keller does not acknowledge universal-
ity as a constituent of the nomothetic epistemology.
She presents the physicist’s “traditional holy grail of
universal ‘laws’” (2007) as if it were a horizon, while
it is, instead, part of their way. Asking Barabási to
abandon his “faith in, as he says, ‘the unique and
deep meaning of power laws’” (2005: 1066) can be
only as successful as asking a physicist to reprove
physics.
Keller’s position is idiographic, as characterized by
Windelband. She opposes Barabási’s universalism with
the importance of the specific. She defends the rele-
vance of studying phenomena in their uniqueness and
demands that we ponder “when it is useful to simplify,
to generalize, to search for unifying principles, and
when it is not” (2007).
Contrary to Keller, Clauset seems to fully under-
stand the nomothetic approach, and to acknowledge
it. As we have seen, he defends Barabási’s early
“apparent arrogance” and legitimacy to publish a find-
ing “that is merely suggestive so long as it is honestly
made, diligently investigated and embodies a compel-
ling and plausible story.” However, Clauset (2005b)
also demands “falsifiable hypotheses by which
[Barabási’s claims] could be invalidated.” His refuta-
tion in 2018 does not touch upon the postulate of uni-
versality, but its empirical validity conditions.
The nomothetic quest for universal laws requires by
nature changing theory in the face of evidence: The
better model replaces the worse. Evidence always has
some degree of looseness in this context, as laws are
only as good as the experiments. Barabási opposes this
argument to Clauset, insisting that his “findings do not
undermine the idea that scale-freeness underlies many
or most complex networks” (Klarreich, 2018). But
“Clauset doesn’t find this analogy convincing” and
replies that “it is reasonable to believe a fundamental
phenomenon would require less customized detective
work” (Klarreich, 2018). Clauset et al. (2009) defend
a decade-old agenda of assessing the experimental
validity of scale-freeness.
Barabási’s experimental program is derived from
theory (it is, nevertheless, empirical). His pioneering
work on scale-freeness (Barabási and Albert, 1999)
prompted multiple authors to seek it in various con-
texts. The subsequent wave of empirical findings rein-
forced his claim for the pervasiveness of complex
networks (list in e.g. Lima-Mendez and Van Helden,
2009). As Galison (1999) observed in another context,
theorists (Barabási) “trade experimental predictions”
(pervasiveness) “for experimentalists’ results” (146).
The experimental program gradually affirmed by
Clauset is that of an experimentalist. It leaves behind
the model-based goals of theorists and focuses instead
on experimental validity—Popperian falsifiability. By
reclaiming the right to invalidate theory by experiment,
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Clauset challenged Barabási’s nomothetic program and
set foot on idiographic ground.
Galison (1999: 146) makes relevant remarks on the
situation:
the two subcultures may altogether disagree about the
implications of the information exchanged or its episte-
mic status. For example, . . . theorists may predict the
existence of an entity with profound conviction because
it is inextricably tied to central tenets of their
practice . . .The experimentalist may receive the predic-
tion as something quite different, perhaps as no more
than another curious hypothesis to try out on the next
run of the data-analysis program. But despite these
sharp differences, it is striking that there is a context
within which there is a great deal of consensus. In this
trading zone, phenomena are discussed by both
sides. . . . It is the existence of such trading zones, and
the highly constrained negotiations that proceed within
them, that bind the otherwise disparate subcultures
together.
The controversy reveals tensions between the agendas
of different subcultures where distinct approaches to
knowledge prevail. Galison suggests that such episte-
mic rifts are the norm rather than the exception. These
epistemic tensions existed before the controversy, and I
see no reason to doubt they can survive it.
Barzel (2018), Vespignani, Watts (Klarreich, 2018),
and Holme (2019) acknowledge the importance of
Broido and Clauset’s (2018, 2019) work. Of course, it
promises better validity standards for the field. But
more importantly, by declaring a new experimental
program, their work shows the way out of the long-
lasting controversy.
I suggest a plausible interpretation of the controver-
sy. The accumulation of evidence against the universal-
ity of scale-freeness weakened Barabási’s empirical
program. However, most actors still agree on the per-
vasiveness of complex networks—whatever that means.
As Broido and Clauset’s program is resilient to the
critique of universality, actors may adopt it to design
their own experiments. I see theorists and experimen-
talists as the two legs of the field. When the theoretical
leg weakened, the weight naturally shifted to the exper-
imental leg. The controversy made visible an otherwise
latent difference of perspective.
Conclusion
In this article, I account for a long-lasting controversy
in network science on the nature of scale-freeness. The
first dispute in 2005 focuses on the similarity of the
power-law and log-normal distributions; the second,
in 2018, on the statistical characterization of scale-
freeness. Many network scientists have commented
on the situation, generally framing it as a conflict
between physicists and statisticians, and assuming
that the controversy had been settled around 2010.
Thus, they were surprised by its resurgence.
I propose another interpretation that better
accounts for the resilience of the controversy. The
core disagreement lies in the epistemic status of scale-
freeness: a sign of a universal law for some, character-
ization of empirical phenomena for others. Like
Galison (1999), I observe epistemic subcultures with
different approaches to knowledge. Theorists elaborate
models and predictions. Experimentalists stabilize the
procedures necessary to account for empirical phenom-
ena. These subcultures do not have the same epistemic
perspectives, or the same goals.
We can describe these stances with what the philos-
opher Windelband introduced as nomothetic and idio-
graphic approaches to knowledge (Lindlof, 2008).
Theorists seek universal laws whose existence they pos-
tulate. Experimentalists favor accurate and local
descriptions of phenomena. In that sense, network sci-
ence is a trading zone where theorists trade predictions
for experimentalists’ results.
I argue that the controversy was caused by the rise
of an experimental program challenging the theory-
driven approach dominant in the field. Theorists (e.g.,
Barabási) insist that experiments on scale-freeness draw
their validity only from a model. Experimentalists (e.g.,
Clauset) defend the measurement of scale-freeness with
model-independent methods. This disagreement on the
epistemic status of scale-freeness existed before the dis-
pute, but became visible as each party argued for their
own program. The recent endorsement of Clauset’s
endeavor by theorists (e.g., Holme) suggests a shift in
the field in favor of the experimentalist perspective.
The dynamic of network science offers several les-
sons in the era of digitization of the social sciences and
humanities. Commonplace is the defiance of some
scholars regarding the methodological imperialism of
natural sciences, or what they perceive as such. The
critique has merit, but it might be misplaced in the
case of network science, as epistemic gaps do not run
along disciplinary lines. Nomothetic positions in the
social sciences cause trouble, but powerful idiographic
positions also exist within the natural sciences. When
something like the network circulates inside science, it
moves with an assemblage of theories, experimental
results, and material-semiotic practices, including
tools. This assemblage is equivocal by nature, and
can be received in different ways. Freeman (2008)
documented how network centrality circulated from
social network analysis to network science and to phys-
ics, supporting idiographic practices in physics as it
supports nomothetic practices in sociology.
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Transdisciplinary fields like digital methods and
computational social science are natural zones of dia-
logue where network practices and predictive models
trade knowledge despite their different epistemic per-
spectives. As this hybridity is sometimes misconstrued
as a threat to idiographic practices, I find it useful to
remind that idiographic practices exist in the natural
sciences, that influence can go both ways, and that we
can collaborate without abdicating our respective
approaches to knowledge—whatever they are.
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Notes
1. arXiv (pronounced “archive”) is an open access, online
repository where scholars can upload pre-prints. There is
moderation but no peer review. In some disciplines, almost
all the articles are self-archived on it. https://arxiv.org
2. By Holme, as quoted by Klarreich (2018); see the second
dispute.
3. The web changed between the two disputes. The 2005 dis-
pute is discussed on researchers’ blogs; Twitter does not
exist. The 2018 dispute is discussed on Twitter first, then
on other platforms (e.g., Quora), and on just a few blogs.
In the meantime, researchers switched from blogs to
Twitter, like most bloggers. Klarreich’s (2018) piece in
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